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Demarcation	of	Core	and	Periphery	Dichotomy:	Evidence	from	Turkey’s	
Shipyards	for	a	‘Paradoxical	Precarity’	Model	
	
Abstract:					
Combining	ethnographic	inquiries	with	questionnaires,	this	paper	rectifies	the	dearth	
of	systematic	research	on	core	employees	in	Turkey’s	shipyards.	In	doing	so,	it	revises	
conventional	associations	of	precarity	with	the	peripheral	jobs	both	exclusively	and	
predominantly.	 In	particular,	we	point	 to	 the	 rise	of	a	peculiar	model,	 ‘paradoxical	
precarity’,	as	 the	core	 jobs	have	become	more	 identifiable	with	precarity	 than	 the	
rest.	Paradoxical	precarity	has	four	distinguishable	contours:	a)	The	masses	of	core	
employees	lost	their	jobs	to	precarious	workers	b)	Even	so,	a	substantial	proportion	
of	employees	remain	at	the	core	c)	This,	however,	came	at	a	cost:	they	became	more	
dissatisfied	than	others	with	remuneration,	job	security,	employee	involvement	and	
job	 intensity	 whilst	 frustrated	 with	 unions	 and	 d)	 Paradoxical	 precarity	 has	 faced	
political	and	economic	challenges	but	it	is	reproduced	by	a	managerial	short-termism	
under	 competitive	 pressures	 to	 save	 on	 high-skills	 thanks	 to	 an	 ever-increasing	
number	of	graduates.	
	
Introduction		
As	an	offshore	manufacturing	hub,	Turkey’s	shipyards	carry	a	strategic	importance	for	the	European	
Union	as	well	as	a	military	maritime	supplier	for	NATO.	Shipyards	are	also	quintessential	for	Turkey	as	
one	of	the	largest	and	fastest	growing	emerging	market	economies	in	the	World.	There	is,	however,	a	
lack	of	systematic	research	on	Turkey’s	shipyards.	
Likewise,	a	shortage	of	empirical	studies	into	shipyards	is	the	case	in	international	literature.	During	
the	shift	of	shipbuilding	industry	to	emerging	market	economies	in	the	past	few	decades,	research	in	
the	West	had	focused	on	the	socio-economic	handling	of	industrial	decline	(Roberts,	1993).	In	the	ex-
soviet	countries,	especially	in	Poland,	academic	debates	have	mainly	dealt	with	the	macro-economic	
implications	 of	 sectorial	 downturn	 and	 privatisation	 (Valioniene	 &	 Druktenis,	 2013).	 In	 emerging	
economic	market	economies,	on	 the	other	hand,	 there	 is	a	dearth	of	 systematic	 research	 into	 the	
upturn	of	ship-making	and	employment	relations.	This	study	contributes	to	filling	the	research	gap.	
In	particular,	the	present	paper	is	a	pioneering	one	to	examine	the	demarcation	between	the	core	and	
periphery	jobs	in	shipyards.	This	is	important	since	employment	relations	in	Turkey’s	shipyards	have	
recently	gone	through	a	restructuring	process	with	the	deterioration	of	employee	rights.	The	paper	is	
also	 the	 first	 study	 to	 focus	 explicitly	 on	 the	 core	 employees,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 well-established	
literature	on	the	precarious	status	of	periphery	workers	in	various	industries	(Pollert,	1991;	Means,	
2017).	 Investigating	 specifically	 the	 core	 employees	 will	 enable	 us	 to	 evaluate	 empirically	 the	
assumptions	of	precarity	debates	on	the	core	employees.	
From	a	theoretical	perspective,	this	paper	aims	to	inform	conventional	core/periphery	debates	which	
by	and	large	considered	precarity	to	be	a	problem	either	only	for	the	peripheral	jobs	or	essentially	for	
the	peripheral	jobs	(Streeck	and	Thelen,	2005;	Millar,	2017).	As	stipulated	in	the	following	paragraphs,	
we	will	instead	argue	that	the	evidence	from	Turkey	proves	the	advent	of	a	new	phenomenon	which	
is	what	one	might	call	for	the	sake	of	convenience	‘paradoxical	precarity’	since	it	relates	precarity	to	
the	core	jobs	more	than	others.	
Although	the	core	and	periphery	distinction	in	workplaces	has	long	been	with	us	(Lash	and	Urry,	1987),	
there	 are	 significant	 differences	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 it.	 Liberal	 pundits,	 for	 example,	 see	 the	
distinction	as	a	functional	bifurcation	in	terms	of	the	division	of	labour.	It	is	noted	that	not	every	job	
or	 employee	would	 equally	 contribute	 to	 the	organisation	due	 to	 their	 strategic	 positions.	 In	 that	
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sense,	a	CEO,	for	example,	is	classified	as	a	core	employee,	whereas	a	window	cleaner	is	regarded	as	
periphery	 (Palier	 and	 Thelen,	 2010).	 They	 argue	 that	 such	 a	 functional	 division	between	 core	 and	
periphery	jobs	are	essential	for	equitable	rewarding	of	employees	in	line	with	their	education,	skills,	
occupations	and	surplus	to	the	companies	(Bergström	and	Storrrie,	2003;	Means,	2017).	The	diversity	
may	 also	 inform	 the	 variations	 in	 employees’	 contractual	 status	 such	 as	 temporary	 or	 part-time	
employment	(Heyes,	2011).	In	particular,	it	is	put	forward	that	as	the	commercial	firms	mature,	they	
would	 aim	 to	 ease	 their	 dependency	 on	 strategically	 critical	 employees	 through	 automation	 and	
deskilling	in	the	core	jobs	whilst	improving	the	work	organisation	(Streeck	and	Thelen,	2005).	
Critiques,	on	the	other	hand,	contested	that	a	dualistic	distinction	between	the	core	and	periphery	is	
not	intrinsically	a	functional	differentiation	but	it	may	well	be	a	manifestation	of	political	attributions,	
at	best,	to	functional	variations	in	terms	of	rewarding	(Lewchuk,	2017).	In	that	sense,	it	is	a	choice	for	
the	prevailing	workplace	regime	to	decide	whether	a	given	‘periphery	job’	will	be	a	decent	job	or	less	
than	that	(Green,	2008).	Therefore,	 it	 is	necessary	to	go	beyond	the	human	capital	or	 ‘supply	side’	
approaches	for	a	fuller	understanding	of	precarity	(Means,	2017).	Accordingly,	concerns	over	two-tier	
labour	markets	have	long	been	expressed	in	the	last	couple	of	decades	claiming	that	they	pave	the	
way	for	precarity	in	the	periphery	jobs	characterised	by	a	manifold	of	disadvantages	including	poverty,	
insecurity	and	non-unionisation	(Green	et	al,	2010).	Political	arbitrations	have	been	further	clarified	
in	the	case	of	international	migration	in	recent	years	as	it	has	added	another	layer	to	the	precarity	in	
peripheral	jobs	(Alberti,	2014).	
Especially	in	more	recent	critical	debates,	it	has	also	been	stipulated	that	precarity	in	general	expands	
into	the	core	jobs	by	degrading	employees’	status	in	such	jobs.	More	and	more	core	employees	have	
begun	to	be	paid	poorly	and	they	have	little	job	security	due	to	a	widening	use	of	temporary	and	part-
time	 contracts	 (Gallie	et	al,	 2017).	 They	 are	 also	becoming	de-unionised	with	 a	 restricted	 legal	 or	
compensatory	protection	against	 –unfair–	dismissals	 (Broughton	et	al,	 2016).	An	example	given	 in	
support	 of	 this	 argument	 is	 the	 growing	 proportion	 of	 ‘the	 second	 class’	managers.	 Despite	 their	
continuing	managerial	responsibilities,	particularly	the	less	educated	managers	have	been	moved	to	
a	precarious	status,	and	they	are	often	paid	minimum	wage	(Green,	2008).	Better	educated	people	
faced	similar	challenges	due	to	over	qualification	as	well.	An	increasing	number	of	degree	holders,	for	
example,	were	reported	to	have	worked	in	elementary	jobs,	and	this	was	disproportionately	pertinent	
to	the	well-educated	migrants	(Frei	&	Sousa-Poza,	2012).	In	addition	to	occupations,	core	industries	
have	been	increasingly	drifting	toward	precarious	employment	with	low	pay	and	insecure	jobs	amid	a	
process	of	de-unionisation	(Holst,	2014).	
In	this	paper,	however,	we	argue	that	the	debates	reviewed	so	far	need	to	be	updated	in	order	to	
better-comprehend	the	current	state	of	precarity	which	we	call	‘paradoxical	precarity’.	The	reason	for	
this,	we	suggest,	is	because	the	conventional	associations	of	precarity	with	the	peripheral	jobs	either	
exclusively	or	predominantly	are	becoming	less	and	less	relevant	(Millar,	2017).	Precarity	appears	to	
have	reached	a	tipping	point	where	it	has	become	a	more	defining	characteristic	for	the	core	jobs	than	
it	is	for	the	rest.	That	is,	the	advantages	of	core	jobs	are	now	blended	with	a	more	pronounced	level	
of	precarity	compared	to	other	jobs.	Even	if	the	core	employees,	for	example,	are	more	likely	to	hold	
better-paid	and	permanent	jobs	than	the	rest,	financially	they	may	struggle	more	and	have	less	job	
security	as	a	relatively	higher	level	of	union	density	among	them	keeps	further	justifying	the	notorious	
hallow-shell	metaphor	(Hayman,	1997).			
It	would	be	 too	 simplistic	 to	assume	 that	 the	paradoxical	precarity	 is	 a	 straightforward	process.	A	
higher	level	of	precarity	among	the	core	employees	can	be	considered	to	be	a	price	to	be	paid	to	retain	
such	jobs.	Nevertheless,	this	does	not	mean	that	core	employees	are	necessarily	happy	with	the	‘new	
deal’	as	witnessed	by	sporadic	political	backlashes	in	the	shape	of	hidden	as	well	as	open	resistance	
such	as	absenteeism	and	slowing	down	the	work	(Yucesan-Ozdemir,	2003).	So	much	so	that	one	feels	
the	need	to	question	the	economic	rationale	of	paradoxical	precarity	for	businesses	due	to	potential	
productivity	losses	and	the	deterioration	of	work	discipline,	not	least	because	of	the	difficulties	with	
controlling	highly-skilled	employees	(Wang	and	Heyes,	2017).	Even	so,	paradoxical	precarity	may	well	
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be	reproduced	by	the	opportunist	companies	and	industries,	especially	when	they	have	little	or	no	
competitive	 edge	 rather	 than	 pushing	 down	 the	 cost	 of	 labour	 as	 an	 immediate	 survival	 strategy	
(Battisti	and	Vallanti,	2013).	
The	explanatory	power	of	the	paradoxical	precarity	will	be	evaluated	in	the	case	of	shipyards	industry	
in	Turkey	as	it	is	expected	to	demonstrate	clear	patterns	owing	to	a	relatively	under	regulated	labour	
market.	We	will	attempt	to	evidence	four	crucial	contours	of	paradoxical	precarity:	a)	The	masses	of	
core	employees	have	lost	their	jobs	to	precarious	workers	in	recent	years;	b)	Even	so,	a	substantial	
proportion	of	the	well-paid	and	highly	skilled	employees	remain	at	the	core;	c)	This,	however,	came	
with	a	cost:	Core	employees	became	more	dissatisfied	than	the	rest	with	remuneration,	job	security,	
employee	involvement	and	job	intensity,	whilst	frustrated	with	unions	and	d)	Paradoxical	precarity	
has	faced	political	and	economic	challenges,	including	loss	of	productivity	particularly	for	an	authority	
crisis	among	the	middle	 level	managers,	yet	 it	 is	bolstered	with	a	managerial	short-termism	under	
competitive	market	pressures.	
Method	
The	present	paper	draws	on	a	mix-method	exploration	(ethnographic	and	quantitative)	conducted	in	
2016.	It	essentially	focuses	on	the	findings	from	sixty	unstructured	conversations	with	employers	(10),	
managers	 (20)	 and	 other	 core	 employees	 (30).	 In	 this	 study,	 core	 employees	 are	 defined	 as	 the	
university	or	vocational	high	school	graduates	as	well	as	highly	skilled	workers	who	have	been	trained	
up	on	the	job	(they	do	a	variety	of	works	from	lathing	to	gear	cutting	with	high-precision).	All	of	the	
core	employees	are	permanent	and	better	paid,	they	are	in	the	top	two	earnings	quintiles	(₺2,000	or	
above	pm,	after	tax).		
Additionally,	the	paper	benefits	from	seven	elite	interviews	in	various	sectorial	bodies,	including	Portal	
Authorities,	 Chamber	 of	 Shipbuilders,	 Association	 of	 Shipbuilders	 and	 Trade	 Unions.	 Quantitative	
results	incorporated	into	the	paper	are	predicated	upon	a	survey	conducted	among	103	core	and	300	
other	employees.	
The	companies	studied	are	located	in	the	Marmara	and	Black	Sea	regions	where	most	of	the	shipyards	
are	situated.	Six	companies	were	investigated	and	two	of	them	are	smaller,	two	of	them	are	medium	
and	the	remaining	two	are	larger	establishments	–	the	small	ones	in	Turkey	are	officially	defined	as	
those	with	less	than	fifty	employees	as	opposed	to	the	medium-sized	ones,	with	up	to	250	employees,	
in	line	with	the	international	literature	(Forth	et	al,	2006).	
Ethical	matters	have	been	given	a	special	 consideration:	Results	are	presented	anonymously	using	
pseudonyms.	Due	to	political	sensitivities,	the	company	and	personal	details	are	reported	in	a	way	
that	cannot	be	traced	back	to	the	data	sources.	
Turkey’s	Shipyards	are	in	Trouble	
Despite	a	long-term	expansion,	Turkey’s	shipyards	have	begun	to	struggle	after	the	2008	turmoil.	For	
example,	the	surge	in	the	number	of	employees	during	the	decade	preceding	the	recession	was	from	
less	than	5,000	to	34,000	in	2007,	but	it	plunged	by	one-third	in	2012	(UBAK,	2014).	Yearly	exports	of	
the	ships	also	halved	between	2009	and	2012	–to	$1.3bn	(Ship2Shore,	2012).	The	recovery	signs	were	
rather	modest	until	2016,	with	a	growth	in	the	output	capacity	to	4.6m	dwt,	exports	to	$1.6bn	and	
employment	to	23,000	(MofTMAC,	2017).	
The	hardships	in	shipyards	were	accompanied	by	the	intensification	of	precarity,	but	this	was	also	part	
of	a	 larger	wave	 in	Turkey.	Since	the	beginning	of	neo-liberal	policies	 in	the	early	1980s,	there	has	
been	 a	 long-term	 rise	 in	 the	 use	 of	 irregular	 employment	 both	 in	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors.	
Irregular	workers	may	work	on	part-time	or	 temporary	 contracts	or	under	 less-protective	working	
terms	against	dismissals	or	unfavourable	remuneration	and	fringe	benefits	regarding	health,	pension,	
holiday	and	welfare	provisions	(Nichols	et	al,	2002).	Such	irregular	employees	often	work	through	the	
third-party/intermediator	agencies.	These	workers	are	usually	called	 ‘tasheron	workers’.	The	word	
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tasheron	refers	to	the	third-party	employer,	but	they	are	not	only	employment	agencies.	They	are	
also	sub-contractors	who	provide	outsourcing	services	usually	in	the	workplaces	of	main	companies.	
Although	 tasheron	 workers	 had	 been	 historically	 preferred	 in	 the	 construction	 industry,	 it	 had	 a	
limited	 use	 owing	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 legal	 recognition.	 After	 a	 gradual	 introduction	 of	 regulations	 for	
flexible	work	as	part	of	the	EU	accession	talks	during	the	last	decade,	the	number	of	tasheron	workers	
increased	to	almost	1.5	million	(Hurriyet,	2016).		
There	are	no	reliable	statistics	about	the	extent	of	the	tasheron	system	in	shipbuilding,	but	in	the	six	
companies	we	investigated,	the	proportion	of	tasheron	workers	ranged	from	one-third	to	two-thirds.	
Such	workers	are	usually	Kurdish	migrants	from	the	Southeast	as	well	as	their	tasheron	employers.	In	
particular,	 we	 found	 that	 roughly	 one	 in	 five	 core	 employees	 in	 the	 companies	 studied	 were	
supplanted	with	tasheron	workers	on	average.	However,	although	the	majority	of	the	core	employees	
managed	 to	 survive	 through,	 the	 replacement	has	 triggered	more	 sense	of	precarity	 among	 them	
compared	to	other	workers.	What	follows	will	analyse	this.	
Unionisation	
Unionisation	in	shipyards	is	undermined	by	the	tasheron	system	as	it	is	virtually	exclusive	to	unions:	
No	tasheron	worker	was	unionised	in	the	companies	studied.	However,	although	a	quarter	of	the	core	
employees	are	members,	unions	do	not	appear	to	be	very	effective	among	them,	either.		
A	manager	admitted	that	one	of	the	important	aspects	of	the	tasheron	system	is	to	stop	unionisation.	
Otherwise,	you	can’t	get	rid	of	the	militancy.	An	HR	manager	disputed	the	legitimacy	of	unions:		
There	 should	 be	 no	 union	 in	 a	 shipyard,	 because	 there	 is	 no	 need	 for	 that.	 In	 our	
company,	for	example,	managers	are	so	good	to	employees	that	no	one	wants	to	join	
or	set	up	a	union.		
However,	if	the	workers	insist	on	joining	a	union	somehow,	then	managers’	good	intentions	would	
not	necessarily	amount	to	compromises.	An	owner	manager	asked	us	not	to	mention	the	unions,	they	
are	 spoiling	 my	 appetite.	 The	 lack	 of	 managerial	 appetite	 helps	 explain	 why	 five	 out	 of	 the	 six	
companies	studied	had	no	recognised	trade	union.	
In	addition	to	engaging	in	collective	bargaining,	the	unionised	company	also	employ	an	activist	of	the	
rivalling	radical	union	as	a	social	worker,	saying	that	better	 to	keep	the	enemy	 in	your	pocket.	The	
management	uses	him	since	workers	have	a	lot	of	respect	and	listen	to	him	about,	for	example,	health	
and	safety	warnings.	The	management,	however,	 lamented	the	radical	union,	and	a	few	managers	
made	serious	accusations.	One	of	them,	for	example,	claimed	that		
those	 thugs	 hire	 a	 private	 ambulance	 and	 ride	 around	 the	 shipyards,	 giving	 the	
impression	that	there	was	yet	another	accident	to	agitate	workers.		
There	are	further	scepticisms	about	the	unions’	ethical	grounds	which	raise	questions	regarding	their	
effectiveness.	The	radical	social	worker	believes	that	the	officially	 recognised	union	 is	sold	out	and	
enslaved	by	capitalism.	When	he	was	talking	in	this	manner	during	a	coffee	break,	an	engineer	had	
shown	an	angry	outburst	towards	him:	You	are	too	sold	out.	Your	radical	union	has	Mercedes	cars	for	
its	leaders!	The	social	worker	denied	the	allegation.	Another	engineer	also	contested	that	I	am	coming	
from	a	unionist	 family	but	 I	hate	unions.	Because	they	simply	exploit	workers’	misery	and	hopes.	A	
project	engineer	added	that	they	only	care	about	filling	their	pockets.		
Table	I	is	somewhere	here	
However,	unions’	ineffectiveness	does	not	seem	to	be	only	about	ethical	issues.	They	have	difficulties	
in	terms	of	making	the	management	listen	to	them.	No	more	than	one	third	of	the	core	employees	
think	that	managers	take	unions	seriously,	as	in	the	case	of	the	rest	(Table	I).	The	radical	social	worker	
contended	that	
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	if	I	ask	the	management	to	change	the	colours	of	sockets	to	prevent	confusions	and	
accidents,	then	they	will	take	the	point.	However,	if	I	say	that	we	want	pay	rise,	then	
they	would	take	the	piss.	
The	authorised	union	values	constructive	relations	with	the	managers	across	the	shipyards,	but	a	top	
union	leader	noted	in	an	interview	that	
sometimes	managers	don’t	even	bother	to	turn	up	to	meetings.	That’s	why,	we	go	on	
strike.	They	lose	but	so	do	we	with	many	more	union	members	dismissed.	
The	weaknesses	of	unions	are	accompanied	by	a	high	level	of	job	insecurity,	especially	among	the	core	
employees	despite	their	lower	turnover	compared	to	the	rest	as	discussed	below.	
Churning	Rates	and	Job	Security	
All	 companies	 studied	 reported	 that	 there	 have	 been	massive	 redundancies	 since	 the	 2008	 crisis	
regardless	of	the	company	size.	Yet	recruitments	in	considerable	numbers	have	also	been	experienced,	
implying	 high	 churning	 rates,	 especially	 in	 recent	 years.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 for	 both	 core	 and	 other	
employees,	despite	a	gap	between	the	two	groups.	Roughly	one-third	of	the	former	have	been	in	the	
company	over	five	years	–twice	higher	than	the	proportion	for	the	latter	(Table	II).		
Employers’	ability	to	reduce	the	number	of	employees	is	limited	by	the	law.	It	dictates	that	shipyards	
have	 to	 employ	 no	 less	 than	 a	 certain	 number	 of	workers	 in	 return	 for	 reclaiming	 lands	 to	 build	
workshops.	A	manager	said	that		
we	employ	over	one	hundred	extra	workers.	Sometimes	we	are	just	hanging	on	the	
cliff-edge	without	a	new	project	in	the	pipeline,	but	we	can’t	lay	them	off	otherwise	
we	have	to	pay	hefty	sums	to	the	state	for	the	land.		
Statutory	 limits	on	reducing	the	number	of	employees	 in	the	companies	rendered	higher	churning	
rates	the	second-best	strategy	to	offset	the	labour	cost.	One	benefit	of	the	higher	churning	rates	for	
the	companies	is	apparently	to	mitigate	the	burden	of	compensations	in	the	case	of	redundancies.	A	
manager	was	worried	that	the	longer	you	work	the	more	expensive	it	becomes	to	dismiss	you.		
Higher	churning	rates	also	have	implications	for	wages	as	longer	tenures	lead	to	more	incremental	
pay	rises.	A	finance	officer	revealed	that		
we	pay	a	lot	for	the	experience	in	this	company.	People	may	earn	20%	higher	than	a	
novice	for	the	same	job.		
Table	II	is	somewhere	here	
It	was	also	underlined	that	newcomers	always	have	higher	motivations.	A	top	manager	emphasised	
that		
it	 is	good	to	have	 fresh	blood	thanks	 to	 the	new	universities.	So	much	so	 that	new	
starters	are	sometimes	castigated	by	 the	 longer	working	staff	 saying	 that	 ‘you	will	
have	the	chance	to	please	your	boss	tomorrow,	too’.	
Ageism	is	part	of	the	high	turnover	strategies.	Employees	in	shipyards	tend	to	be	younger,	two-thirds	
of	them	are	under	their	mid-thirties.	When	asked,	an	HR	manager	made	it	plain	that		
we	do	not	care	about	people’s	ages,	but	it	is	nonsense	to	apply	for	a	job	here	when	
you	are	getting	to	your	sixties.	This	is	a	tough	work.		
It	 is	also	assumed	that	younger	people	would	be	keener	on	moving	to	another	job	hoping	to	strike	
better	deals.	A	quality	control	manager	indicated	that		
if	a	young	man	is	not	happy	with	this	shipyard,	then	he	can	go	to	another	company	to	
find	the	one	that	suits	him	well.	Why	should	one	waste	his	life	in	a	dislikeable	job?	
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High	churning	rates	reflect	on	the	sense	of	job	security.	An	engineer	argued	that	there	is	no	job	security	
in	this	company	because	of	the	tasheron	system.	A	tasheron	employer	providing	cleaning	services	also	
endorsed	this:	
The	mother	 company	 cannot	 recruit	 people	 directly	 as	 its	 own	 employee	 in	many	
cases,	because	compensation	fines	would	be	tremendous	at	the	dismissal	trials.		
Some	other	challenges	to	job	security	were	also	brought	up.	A	company	owner/manager	whose	work	
shop	had	hibernated	for	two	years	due	to	lack	of	demand	after	the	recession	attempted	to	explain	the	
sense	of	insecurity	in	shipyards	in	general:			
Shipbuilding	 is	 dependent	 on	 shipping	 and	 shipping	 is	 dependent	 on	 international	
trade.	No	one	knows	what	happens	tomorrow.	We	did	not	expect	the	2008	crisis	but	
it	happened	anyway,	and	the	business	hasn’t	fully	picked	up	yet.	
A	purchasing	director	related	the	fragility	of	business	to	its	reliance	on	only	a	few	suppliers’	good	will:	
We	have	to	choose	the	right	suppliers.	If	something	goes	wrong	with	them,	then	we	
are	all	in	trouble.	How	can	you	feel	secure?		
A	marketing	manager	shed	more	light	into	the	contingency	of	business	on	suppliers:		
Although	it	is	not	always	feasible	for	the	suppliers	to	go	for	oligopolistic	price	fixing,	
they	can	opt	for	a	strategic	valuation	in	the	case	of	some	inventive	edges	or	things	like	
that.	You	only	hope	then	to	save	with	the	new	technology.		
A	quality	control	manager	similarly	added	that	the	faith	of	shipyards	is	also	at	the	mercy	of	individual	
customers,	making	a	useful	comparison:	
Shipyards	are	not	like	the	car	industry	where	if	a	customer	does	not	like	your	product,	
it	 is	 just	fine.	You	have	thousands	more.	But	we	have	only	one	or	two	customers.	 If	
they	change	their	minds,	then	we	will	instantly	get	capsized.		
Turkey’s	political	climate	brings	in	further	layers	to	insecurity:	The	owner	and	manager	of	a	shipyard	
expressed	his	opinion:		
We’ve	shot	down	the	Russian	jet,	and	now	our	orders	from	Russia	have	come	to	a	halt	
like	anything	else.	God	knows	 if	we	will	have	another	 coup	 tomorrow	 (this	 remark	
refers	to	a	failed	coup	attempt	in	June	2016).	
The	sequential	dependency	of	whole	production	process	on	even	a	single	engineer	occasionally	puts	
individuals,	as	well	as	the	companies,	on	the	line.	A	manufacturing	manager	confessed	that		
I	just	fired	the	quality	control	engineer	two	days	ago	since	she	brought	everything	to	
a	breaking	point	with	her	fussiness.	But	then	I	started	to	feel	different,	maybe	I	was	
too	harsh.	I	should	call	her	back	probably.		
Despite	the	relatively	lower	level	of	churning	rates	among	the	core	employees	compared	to	others,	a	
higher	proportion,	half	of	them	believe	that	there	is	no	job	security	in	their	workplace,	whereas	this	
is	down	to	just	above	one-third	for	the	rest	(Table	I).	One	reason	suggested	by	a	tasheron	worker	for	
this	paradox	was	the	following:	
We	already	know	from	the	scratch	that	our	contracts	are	for	a	short	period,	that’s	why	
we	are	better	prepared.	We	don’t	get	nasty	surprises.	We	start	looking	for	other	jobs	
before	the	termination	of	terms.	We	also	avoid	ages-long	financial	commitments.	
A	tasheron	further	highlighted	that	‘the	end	of	project	in	a	shipyard	does	not	necessarily	mean	the	
end	of	job:	
We	often	transfer	our	workers	to	other	shipyards	where	we	have	some	other	projects	
to	work	with	when	the	job	is	done	here.	
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Pertinently,	 a	 considerable	 proportion	 of	 the	 participants,	 including	 over	 one	 third	 of	 the	 core	
employees	did	not	consider	job	security	an	issue	either,	notwithstanding	all	the	issues	delineated	so	
far	(Table	I).	A	manager	was	of	the	view	that		
this	is	because	there	is	no	fear	from	joblessness.	There	are	vacancies	everywhere	for	
the	qualified	 staff.	 If	 you	 lose	your	 job	here,	 then	you	can	go	and	get	another	one	
somewhere	else.		
Even	so,	the	sense	of	job	insecurity	and	high	churning	rates	support	a	deadly	work	tempo	about	which	
particularly	the	core	employees	have	no	vote	as	highlighted	in	what	follows.	
Job	Intensification		
A	planning	chief	spelled	out	how	the	pace	of	work	is	intense	because	of	the	nature	of	the	production	
in	shipyards:	
We	have	two	pools	for	the	ships	that	we	manufacture	or	repair.	We	can’t	start	off	a	
new	ship	unless	we	complete	the	work	with	the	ones	we	have	in	our	hands.	That	is,	
the	faster	you	are,	the	more	profitable	your	company	will	be,	simple	as	that.	
The	head	of	the	Association	for	Ship	Builders	noted	that	the	industry	commonly	suffers	from	delays:	
Keeping	up	with	the	deadlines	is	a	common	problem	across	the	industry.	Companies	
often	fail	to	forecast	an	accurate	timetable.	Therefore,	they	often	run	late.	
When	the	head	of	the	Portal	Authorities	was	interviewed,	he	specifically	pointed	to	the	inefficiency	of	
planning	in	shipyards:	
Delays	are	one	of	the	general	issues	in	the	whole	industry	because	of	the	difficulties	
with	the	planning	details.	
A	planning	manager	unwrapped	some	challenges	in	his	job:		
Punctuality	is	a	joke,	you	are	dependent	on	so	many	people,	including	tasheron	firms.	
Repairing	 is	 particularly	 hopeless:	 You	 fix	 something	 but	 simply	 for	 that	 reason,	
something	else	may	start	malfunctioning!	
Insightful	comparisons	to	other	industries	were	advanced.	A	maintenance	engineer	stressed	that		
in	the	car	industry,	it	is	easy	to	see	whether	the	work	is	running	late	on	the	basis	of	
seconds	whereas	in	the	shipyards	it	may	take	months	to	develop	a	proper	assessment.	
Quality	 control	 teams	 in	 the	manufacturing	departments	 deliberately	exacerbate	 the	difficulties.	A	
quality	control	chief	said	that		
we	are	the	enemy	from	inside,	so	to	speak.	Everybody	tries	to	finish	the	job	asap.	We	
make	things	more	difficult	inevitably:	In	the	fridge	industry,	for	example,	if	there	is	a	
welding	error,	then	you	can	simply	remove	the	faulty	fridge.	In	ship	yards,	that	simple	
welding	error	may	cost	a	ship,	if	not	lives.		
CC	TVs	cover	every	inch	and	monitor	everyone,	especially	in	the	larger	shipyards.	An	engineer	was	of	
the	view	that		
this	 equipment	 is	 installed	 to	 ensure	 that	 everybody	 complies	with	 the	 health	 and	
safety	regulations,	but	they	also	function	as	the	tools	of	scrutinizing	employees’	speed,	
making	people	nervous	ironically.		
The	widening	use	of	card-readers	at	the	gates	has	heightened	the	pressure	for	punctuality.	A	chief	
accountant	felt	strong	about	this:	
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Since	a	new	card	system	is	installed	at	the	entrance,	you	lose	half	day	wage	if	you	are	
late	twenty	minutes.	Also,	you	can	sign	in	only	after	putting	on	your	work	uniforms,	
helmets,	shoes	and	gloves	first.		
The	failure	to	pace	up	with	the	speed	of	production	may	risk	becoming	stigmatized.	An	engineer	noted	
that		
there	are	some	rouge	culprits	on	drugs.	They	come	to	work	trying	to	hide	it	but	they	
cannot	cover	up	lagging	behind	all	the	time.	
The	skills	that	particularly	core	employees	may	possess	do	not	necessarily	yield	powers	to	negotiate	
for	a	reduced	work	load.	An	area	manager	expressed	his	anger:		
I	know	two	foreign	languages	and	I	have	quite	a	few	certificates,	but	we	work	so	long	
that	sometimes	I	feel	like	I	would	be	better	off	I	were	peddling	lemons	in	the	streets.	
A	construction	engineer	contested	that	although	tasheron	workers	are	under	a	horrendous	pressure,	
the	 rest	 don’t	 only	 have	 to	 pace	 up	with,	 but	 also	 lead	 them.	 Some	 companies	 use	 performance	
assessment	to	keep	up	the	pressure	on	the	core	employees.	An	HR	Director	said	that		
we	have	annual	assessment	exercises	with	a	standard	Human	Resources	Assessment	
(HRA)	form.	We	check	who	or	which	departments	are	doing	better	or	worse.	If	too	bad,	
they	get	friendly	fires.		
A	repairment	foreman	explicitly	stated	that	extra	cost	of	the	delays	usually	results	in	dismissals	whilst	
a	planning	chief	drew	attention	to	the	impact	of	unbelievable	pressure	on	her	social	life:	
I	am	living	with	my	mother;	I	can’t	sort	my	life	on	my	own	since	I	am	too	busy.	I	have	
two	weeks	of	annual	leave,	but	I	just	can’t	use	it	at	all.	
Pressure	at	work	can	spoil	the	work-life	balance	even	more	when	it	is	added	on	by	commuting	as	a	
common	way	of	transport	to	work,	especially	among	the	highly	skilled	staff:	A	quality	control	manager	
shared	her	frustration:		
I	have	to	commute	from	Istanbul.	A	friend	of	mine	called	the	other	day	and	she	just	
nagged	about	me	‘living	only	three	hours	a	day’.		
A	logistic	manager	noted	that	 increasing	overtime	work	could	help	release	the	pressure,	but	almost	
two-thirds	of	the	core	employees,	compared	to	just	above	40%	of	the	rest	have	little	or	no	say	about	
their	working	hours	(Table	II).	He	explained	that	
Paid	 overtime	 is	 not	 the	 first	 choice	 for	 the	 companies	 whereas	 employees	 would	
welcome	more	of	it.	This	means	conflict	of	interests	in	terms	of	speed.		
When	asked,	H&S	chief	warned	that	speed	claims	lives,	and	ruins	his	peace	of	mind:	
Speed	itself	is	one	of	the	main	causes	of	fatal	accidents…	And	guess	who	is	to	blame	
for	 this?	 It	 is	 me!	 Therefore,	 I	 keep	 a	 suitcase	 ready	 all	 the	 time	 to	 go	 to	 prison,	
although	I	do	everything	under	my	jurisdiction	to	prevent	accidents.	
The	detrimental	implications	of	job	intensification	are	embedded	in	a	managerial	understanding	that	
is	largely	dismissive	to	the	contribution	of	(particularly	the	core)	employees	to	the	decision-making	
processes	as	debated	below.		
Employee	Involvement		
The	majority	of	the	core	employees,	like	the	rest	of	the	respondents	included	in	the	survey	reported	
that	they	were	satisfied	with	the	level	of	discretion	they	had	about	their	tasks	(Table	I).	Here	is	a	typical	
remark	made	during	the	conversations:		
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We	decide	about	the	ways	in	which	we	carry	out	our	tasks,	and	managers	specifically	
consult	our	expertise	to	make	decisions.		
However,	 optimism	 about	 employee	 involvement	 tumbles	 when	 it	 comes	 to	matters	 beyond	 the	
specific	 tasks.	 Hardly	 half	 of	 the	 respondents,	 with	 a	 significantly	 lower	 proportion	 of	 the	 core	
employees,	are	satisfied	with	the	participation	 in	broader	decision-making	processes	 (Table	 I).	The	
restricted	 nature	 of	 employee	 involvement	 was	 eloquently	 captured	 by	 a	 top	 manager	 in	 a	
multinational	company:		
Shipyards	are	no	republics.	They	are	run	with	a	dry	sense	of	rationality:	When	we	find	
a	job,	the	customer	gives	us	all	the	details	about	the	ship	they	want.	That	leaves	us	
without	much	flexibility:	We	have	to	choose,	if	you	call	it	like	that,	certain	material,	
designs,	qualifications	etc.	as	the	patron	wishes.	
It	was	underscored	that	involvement	is	curbed	by	the	paucity	of	room	for	technological	manoeuvre	as	
well.	An	R&D	officer	said	that		
if	we	need	spare	parts	for	the	cranes,	for	example,	then	we	import	them.	We	don’t	
have	 the	 capacity	 to	 designing	 and	manufacturing	 since	we	 have	 no	 research	 and	
development	facilities.	You	mostly	need	a	CNC	(3D	printer)	for	the	manufacturing,	but	
we	don’t	make	it,	either.	
Some	managers	 think	 that	engineers	 cannot	 contribute	a	 lot	 to	 the	management	of	 companies.	A	
manager	contended	that		
engineers	are	essentially	messengers	between	workers	and	the	superiors.	If	workers	
bring	up	a	problem,	then	they	report	the	issue	to	the	higher-ranked	staff	and	then	they	
take	the	solution	back	to	workers.		
This	understanding	helps	explain	why	one-third	of	the	core	employees,	as	the	rest,	indicated	that	they	
have	little	or	no	say	regarding	work	design	(Table	II).	However,	there	was	no	shortage	of	gloomy	views	
as	exemplified	by	another	manager	in	an	attempt	to	further	elucidate	why	the	core	employees	have	
such	a	poor	involvement:		
Who	would	accept	to	work	outside	 in	such	a	horrible	weather?	Of	course,	the	ones	
who	have	no	other	choice	no	skills	or	no	education.	They	can’t	even	comprehend	the	
command	chain.	If	there	is	a	problem,	they	just	talk	to	higher	managers	bypassing	the	
immediate	 engineers.	 Then	 the	 engineers	 can’t	 carry	 out	 their	 tasks,	 let	 alone	
participating	in	broader	decisions.	
Such	a	claim	should	be	taken	together	with	nearly	45%	of	the	core	employees	who	have	little	or	no	
say	regarding	task	distribution	whereas	the	proportion	turns	out	to	be	somewhat	lower	for	the	rest,	
37%	(Table	II).	Some	core	employees	consider	the	rest	docile	and	offensiveness	is	blended	with	racism.	
An	engineer	indicated	that		
tasheron	 employees	 are	 silly	 cows.	 If	 I	 ask	 them	 to	 stand	 outside	 for	 hours	 to	 do	
nothing,	 they	won’t	question.	Five	or	six	of	 them	sleep	 in	 the	same	room,	still	 they	
don’t	question.	They	are	so	blindly	adhered	to	tribal	norms	that	they	could	not	possibly	
disobey	their	tasheron	bosses.	
One	may	consider	employees’	satisfaction	with	the	tangible	rewards	to	see	if	they	help	make	all	the	
issues	outlined	so	far	bearable,	especially	for	the	core	employees	given	that	they	earn	more	than	the	
rest.		
Satisfaction	with	fringe	benefits	and	pay	
Fringe/social	benefits	in	Turkey	cover	a	wide	range	of	areas	from,	for	instance,	free	transport	to	free	
health	care	for	the	employees	and	their	dependants	as	well	as	the	pension	premiums.	An	HR	manager	
claimed	that		
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fringe	 benefits	 may	 come	 even	 before	 the	 wages	 for	 some	 employees.	 People	
sometimes	work	for	free	just	to	complete	the	minimum	years	of	service	required	for	
the	retirement.	
Transport	 is	 critical	 for	 the	 commuters	 since	 they	 have	 to	 cross	 the	 straights	 of	 Bosporus	 and	
Dardanelle.	Larger	establishments	provide	transport	for	thousands	of	employees	everyday	with	their	
own	vessels.	Both	core	employees	and	 the	 rest	have	access	 to	 the	 free	 transport.	Companies	also	
provide	land	transport,	but	it	is	limited.	The	limitedness	of	land-transport	is	attributed	to	the	laziness	
of	local	people	by	some	managers:		
People	in	this	town	are	lazy,	they	are	living	on	the	dole	and	they	don’t	want	to	work	
for	decent	wages.		
However,	 services	 are	made	 available	 for	 the	 hundreds	 of	 local	 people,	 especially	 by	 the	 smaller	
establishments.	A	local	economist	emphasised	that	I	would	not	work	here	if	there	were	no	transport.	
A	manager	also	indicated	that		
there	is	no	public	transport	to	the	neighbouring	villages,	therefore	it	is	important	to	
arrange	shuttle	busses.		
On	balance,	barely	more	than	one	in	two	respondents	are	satisfied	with	the	fringe	benefits,	with	a	
little	 difference	 between	 core	 employees	 and	 the	 rest	 (Table	 I).	 This	 is	 interesting	 since	 tasheron	
workers	 are	notoriously	deprived	of	welfare	entitlements.	A	 staff	development	officer	 like	 several	
other	participants	complained	that,		
employers	 are	 avoiding	 their	 existing	 responsibilities	 by	 dumping	 workers	 onto	
tasheron	firms	which	often	fail	 to	pay	pension	contributions	and	employees’	health	
insurance.	They	don’t	even	pass	the	child	credit	given	by	the	state	to	their	workers.	
The	 low	satisfaction	with	 the	benefits	among	 the	core	employees	has	a	 lot	 to	do	with	an	ongoing	
dispute	 over	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 shipyards.	 Trade	 unions	 are	 urging	 the	 government	 to	 recognise	
shipbuilding	as	a	‘heavy	industry’	in	order	to	gain	a	prerogative	to	earlier	retirement	(mostly	for	the	
core	employees)	with	lower	employee	contributions	and	higher	pension	premiums.	Participants	did	
not	have	high	hopes	on	this	issue.	An	engineer	cited	some	press	commentaries:		
All	we	know	who	the	owner	of	this	company	is	(a	top	statement).	So,	why	he	would	be	
bothered	with	giving	more	rights	to	employees.	The	state	is	operated	by	the	bosses.	
As	mentioned	earlier,	core	employees	earn	more	than	the	rest,	and	the	tasheron	system	in	particular	
emerges,	according	to	an	area	manager,	as	a	mind-boggling	evidence	of	corporate	greed.	In	one	of	
the	 companies	 investigated,	 such	workers	 rest,	and	 sometimes	 live	 in	a	 compound	which	 is	 called	
‘China	town’	or	Gypsy	town’	as	a	racist	tribute	to	their	exploitation.		
However,	less	than	half	of	the	core	employees	are	satisfied	with	their	pay	which	is	significantly	low	
compared	to	the	rest	(Table	I).	When	shared	during	the	follow	up	conversations,	these	results	were	
deemed	unexpected	by	some	managers.	An	HR	manager	typically	said	that		
I	am	surprised,	but	this	can’t	be	in	our	company.	It	must	be	in	the	other	companies	you	
are	investigating,	right?	
When	some	other	managers	were	told	that	a	similar	proportion	is	also	the	case	in	their	companies,	
they	 tended	 to	 suggest	 that	we	 are	 all	 human	 beings,	 we	 always	want	more.	 In	 response	 to	 the	
contradiction	between	those	who	were	satisfied	with	their	pay	and	the	remainder,	some	managers	
contested	that	the	dissatisfied	ones	must	be	the	recently	started	younger	employees:		
They	 must	 be	 the	 new	 recruits.	 We	 can’t	 do	 anything	 about	 them.	 They	 have	 no	
practical	 experience.	 Their	 theoretical	 knowledge	 is	 also	weak	because	of	 the	poor	
quality	of	their	education,	particularly	in	those	new	private	universities.	
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However,	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	higher	dissatisfaction	of	core	employees	than	the	rest	about	
their	wages	would	not	be	possible	without	addressing	the	pay	regime.	An	engineer	contended	that		
a	 graduate	 engineer	 may	 get	 ₺2,000	 but	 most	 engineers	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 do	
overtime	but	even	the	tasheron	workers	are.	Companies	say	that	we	only	intervene	if	
there	is	a	trouble	rather	than	working	continuously…	I	deserve	more	than	what	I	get.	
Actually,	I	am	seeking	a	new	job	anyway.	
Another	participant	who	works	as	a	public-sector	H&S	consultant	in	shipyards	complained	about	his	
ridiculous	pay	compared	to	the	private	sector:		
If	 I	work	 in	 the	private	 sector	 I	would	earn	 twice	more	 than	what	 I	 earn	 currently,	
₺6,000	pm.	I	don’t	go	to	private	sector,	because	I	believe	that	we	need	idealist	people	
to	show	the	public	that	H&S	is	vital	for	all.	
When	asked	about	the	links	between	pay	and	performance,	some	managers	dismissed	any	connection	
between	those	two.	A	smaller	establishment	manager	suggested	that	higher	pay	is	no	way	to	boost	
performance.	The	more	you	pay,	the	higher	wages	employees	will	ask	for.	
Nevertheless,	pay	 is	 related	to	performance	 in	the	 larger	companies.	An	HR	Director,	 for	example,	
noted	that	the	HRA	form	referred	to	hitherto	is	used	to	determine	individual	pay	raises.	Additionally,	
the	 heads	 of	 the	 departments	 may	 propose	 increments	 for	 the	 better	 performing	 individuals.	 A	
finance	director,	for	instance,	made	it	plain	that	I	occasionally	make	suggestions	to	the	board	since	I	
am	happy	with	some	employees’	track	records.		
There	are	demoralising	doubts	about	the	performance	measurements	among	the	core	employees.	An	
accountant,	for	example,	touched	upon	the	transparency	issue:		
In	the	finance	department,	wages	wildly	vary,	between	₺1,500	and	₺5,000,	but	 it	 is	
not	always	clear	how	some	get	hikes	or	nothing,	because	we	all	do	the	same	jobs	at	
the	same	levels.	There	is	no	openness	about	arbitrary	decisions.	
The	evidence	presented	so	far	proves	that	employees	are	concerned	with	both	tangible	and	intangible	
issues,	but	this	is	particularly	so	for	the	core	employees.	The	following	section	raises	questions	about	
the	economic	wisdom	of	such	a	situation	for	the	companies.	
Handicaps	and	the	rationale	of	Paradoxical	Precarity	
Paradoxical	precarity	hampers	productivity	and	motivation:	The	majority	of	the	core	employees	failed	
to	indicate	that	employees’	productivity	in	general	or	their	own	individual	productivity	in	particular	is	
either	‘very	good’	or	‘good’	(Table	III).	A	long-term	foreman	uttered	that		
you	need	to	make	employees	feel	that	they	are	valued.	If	you	do	that,	then	they	will	
work	harder.	But	this	is	not	happening.		
Such	a	concern	is	also	substantiated	by	an	HR	manager’s	understanding	of	his	profession.	He	thinks	
that		
we	are	not	HR	managers	at	all.	We	are	just	running	a	personnel	department.	We	have,	
for	example,	no	incentivised	rewarding	system.	You	can’t	utilise	it	in	shipyards	because	
we	don’t	produce	piece	by	piece.		
When	asked,	however,	he	admitted	that	I	do	not	know	much	about	how	the	business	is	run	in	other	
shipyards,	we	have	little	contact	with	each	other.		
Table	III	is	somewhere	here	
An	environmental	engineer	also	complained	about	an	acute	shortage	of	appreciation:	The	importance	
of	what	I	am	doing	becomes	clear	to	the	management	only	if	I	make	a	mistake.	A	project	director	has	
sarcastically	pointed	out	that	you	have	to	ignore	the	managers	to	remain	motivated:	
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A	father	and	son	are	running	this	company.	If	you	talk	to	one	of	them	first,	then	the	
other	one	gets	pissed	off	and	tells	you	off.	The	only	way	you	can	retain	your	motivation	
is	just	to	rebuff	them	when	they	scold	you.		
Under	appreciation	of	the	core	employees	means	an	authority	crisis	for	the	middle	managers	in	their	
relations	with	the	shop-floor	workers	at	the	expense	of	productivity.	An	engineer	said	that		
I	am	earning	less	than	a	plumber	since	he	does	overtime.	Sometimes	he	does	not	care	
about	my	technical	instructions	because	he	thinks	that	he	is	smarter	than	me.	And	this	
causes	a	lot	of	delays	in	production.	
These	sorts	of	worries	help	clarify	why	the	majority	of	employees,	especially	the	ones	in	the	core	jobs	
believe	that	managerial	strategies	diminish	their	motivation	and	productivity	(Table	IV).	
The	sense	of	being	under-valued	precipitates	retention	problems	as	unequivocally	evident	among	the	
highly-skilled	employees	commuting	from	the	neighbouring	towns.	A	manager	affirmed	that		
It	 is	 important	 to	avoid	 the	disruption	of	whole	work,	 sometimes	 just	because	of	a	
single	absentee.	We	are	doing	our	best	to	attract	skilled	staff	from	Istanbul,	but	if	they	
are	not	pleased	here,	then	they	start	to	look	for	another	job.		
An	HR	manager	brought	out	that	skill	shortage	is	so	severe	that	it	has	created	counterfeit	certificate	
Mafia:	
Sometimes	candidates	are	fabricating	fake	documents.	To	avoid	the	quality	issues	for	
such	problems,	we	have	to	go	through	a	rigorous	recruitment	process.		
The	pace	of	work	can	also	have	a	detrimental	impact	as	speed	may	well	trigger	a	slowdown	in	practice.	
One	reason	for	this	is	because	speed	deteriorates	motivation.	An	engineer	told	us	that		
if	 you	are	a	welder	 in	 the	 live-stock	 ship,	 then	 you	may	 spend	hours	 on	 your	own.	
Workers	caged	all	day	in	the	animal	partitions	start	to	talk	to	iron	bars.	Do	you	think	
that	people	could	be	motivated	in	a	solitary	confinement?			
Speed	 decelerates	 speed	 further.	 As	 opposed	 to	 the	 core	 employees,	 the	 majority	 of	 others	 are	
convinced	that	the	productivity	of	employees	at	large	as	well	as	that	of	their	own	are	either	‘good’	or	
‘very	good’	(Table	III).	Arguably,	coercive	managerial	strategies	force	them	to	work	harder	in	the	face	
of	their	limited	skills	that	might	help	seek	alternative	jobs.	As	a	result,	however,	the	H&S	issues	turn	
out	to	be	another	reason	as	to	why	speed	means	a	slowdown.	An	H&S	manager	lent	his	comments:	
Mining	 accidents	 or	 plane	 crashes	 happen	 once	 in	 a	while.	 In	 shipyards,	 have	 one	
accident	 today,	 then	 expect	 more	 pretty	 soon	 since	 they	 tend	 to	 be	 about	
infrastructures,	rather	than	a	one-off	clumsiness.	This	shatters	people’s	morale	and	
speed.	Therefore,	European	customers	are	so	twitchy	about	H&S.	
A	construction	manager	put	the	blame	on	the	culture	of	quick-profits:		
Companies	think	that	speed	is	the	short	cut	to	profits.	They	are	struggling	to	come	to	
terms	with	the	role	of	human	factor	in	business.		
A	planning	manager	explained	 the	human	factor	with	 the	 lack	of	enough	communication	between	
managers	and	employees:		
it	is	really	difficult	to	keep	cool	under	pressure.	You	get	stressed	out	and	people	can	
feel	it.	They	avoid	you.	We	have	to	bring	down	the	barriers	of	dialog	by	showing	more	
tolerance.		
A	company	owner	also	indicated	that		
there	is	too	much	distance	between	managers	and	workers.	Discipline	is	important	but	
so	is	communication.		
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Table	IV	is	somewhere	here	
Such	comments	should	be	taken	together	with	the	fact	that	only	just	above	one	third	of	the	core	and	
half	of	the	rest	think	that	managers	treat	them	fairly,	keep	their	promises,	try	to	understand	and	solve	
their	problems	or	help	skill	them	up.	The	proportions	of	those	who	have	reported	good	relations	with	
managers	are	not	much	different	either	(Table	IV).	A	veteran	CEO	observed	that		
we	think	that	we	are	like	a	family	with	workers.	Therefore,	we	don’t	let	them	speak	as	
we	don’t	let	our	children	speak	in	front	of	the	elderly.		
The	family	metaphor	resonates	with	what	the	head	of	the	Shipbuilders’	Association	proposed:		
We	need	more	professionalism	rather	than	traditional	family	management.	Even	the	
large	companies	are	still	lacking	professional	leaders.	
Despite	 the	 pitfalls	 of	 paradoxical	 precarity	 outlined	 above,	 it	 throws	 a	 life-line	 to	 companies	 by	
helping	save	the	day	in	the	face	of	immediate	pressures.	A	general	director	articulated	that	
Normally	you	would	reward	the	staff	to	get	them	better	motivated	and	productive.	
However,	we	can’t	afford,	say,	to	provide	the	middle	managers	with	bridging	contracts	
in	between	projects	which	could	off-load	from	their	minds	the	worry	of	job	security.	
Even	so,	the	company	run	by	the	director	quoted	above	as	well	as	most	of	the	companies	investigated	
have	 seldom	 had	 gaps	 in	 between	 shipbuilding	 projects	 in	 recent	 years.	 A	 production	 manager	
contested	that	
Bridging	contracts	are	not	that	vital,	because	we	have	new	orders	all	the	time.	They	
fire	managers	 every	 now	 and	 then	 just	 to	 slash	 the	management	 cost.	 Otherwise	
shipyards	may	 run	 into	 deficits	 since	 they	 ridiculously	 lower	 the	 bids	 to	 appeal	 to	
armatures	more	than	the	rivalling	manufacturers.	
Conclusion	
Rectifying	the	lack	of	empirical	research,	this	paper	explored	the	process	of	industrial	demarcation	in	
Turkey’s	shipyards	regarding	the	core	and	periphery	dichotomy	by	specifically	focusing	on	the	core	
employees.	 The	 evidence	 presented	 in	 the	 paper	 fails	 to	 endorse	 conventional	 core/periphery	
discussions	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 association	 of	 precarity	 with	 peripheral	 jobs	 either	 exclusively	 or	
predominantly	 (Heyes,	 2011;	 Broughton	 et	 al,	 2016).	 It	 cautions	 the	 debates	 about	 unwittingly	
political	overrating	of	the	core	jobs	(Millar,	2017)	and	human	capital	(Means,	2017).	Empirical	data	
specifically	point	to	the	rise	of	a	paradoxical	precarity	model	that	identifies	core	jobs	with	precarity	
more	than	the	rest	(Lewchuk,	2017).	
Four	distinct	contours	of	paradoxical	precarity	have	been	stipulated.	First,	a	considerable	proportion	
of	the	core	workers	in	shipyards	have	been	replaced	in	recent	years	with	tasheron	workers	who	are	
in	precarious	positions	since	they	are	by	and	large	deprived	of	adequate	remuneration,	social/fringe	
benefits,	unionisation	and	protection	against	unfair	dismissals.	Such	findings	further	substantiate	the	
long-lasting	concerns	over	the	substitution	of	core	jobs	with	the	precarious	ones	(Pollert,	1991;	Green	
et	al,	2010).	
Second,	 a	 substantial	 proportion	 of	 well-paid	 and	 highly	 skilled	 employees	 remain	 at	 the	 core.	
Especially	those	who	gained	their	skills	through	a	formal	education	have	managed	to	survive	through	
the	 harshest	 times	 of	 the	 industrial	 downturn	 and	 restructuring	 following	 the	 great	 depression	
(Means,	2017).		
Third,	the	recruitment	of	tasheron	workers	in	lieu	of	the	core	employees	culminated	in	the	sense	of	
precarity	 among	 the	 remaining	 core	 staff.	 There	 is	 a	marked	dissatisfaction	among	 them	with	 job	
security	(Heyes,	2011),	pay	and	fringe	benefits	(Frei,	2012)	as	well	as	employee	involvement	(Green,	
2008)	whilst	 feeling	too	much	pressure	at	work	(Heyes,	2011)	 in	addition	to	having	 little	 tendency	
toward	unionisation	as	 a	 reflection	of	managerial	 resistance	and	 the	 lack	of	 confidence	 in	unions’	
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effectiveness	 (Gallie	 et	 al,	 2017).	 Critically,	 their	 dissatisfaction	 in	 relation	 to	 such	 issues	 is	more	
pronounced	when	compared	to	other	employees,	although	their	 remuneration	and	working	 terms	
tend	to	be	better	 than	the	rest.	However,	 their	material	advantages	occasionally	hang	on	a	 fragile	
balance	since	a	shop-floor	worker,	for	example,	may	start	to	earn	more	than	a	middle	manager	by	
doing	paid	overtime.	Likewise,	although	the	core	employees	have	lower	churning	rates,	they	have	a	
higher	sense	of	job	insecurity.	Arguably	this	is	not	least	for	the	fact	that	only	one	third	of	them	have	
been	in	the	same	company	over	the	past	five	years	in	contrast	with	the	long-established	history	of	
life-long	employment	in	the	core	jobs	(Cam,	2002).	Meanwhile,	the	mushrooming	engineering	schools	
in	Turkey	provides	a	growing	pool	of	graduates	for	the	recruitments	(Frei	&	Sousa-Poza,	2012).	
Fourth,	 paradoxical	 precarity	 has	 considerable	 pitfalls	 both	 economically	 and	 politically,	 but	 it	 is	
nurtured	 by	 a	 managerial	 short-termism	 under	 competitive	 pressures:	 One	 set	 of	 difficulties	 is	
attributable	to	its	economic	consequences	as	the	evidence	suggests	that	the	model	has	detrimental	
implications	 for	 the	 motivation	 and	 productivity	 of	 employees	 (Battisti	 and	 Vallanti,	 2013).	 In	
particular,	 forcing	the	staff	to	pace	up	with	an	unreasonable	speed	costs	 lives	bringing	employees’	
morale	and	motivation	down	in	the	shipyards	investigated.	Delays	due	to	H&S	matters	also	put	the	
customers	off.		
Another	set	of	handicaps	about	the	paradoxical	precarity	is	related	to	the	workplace	politics.	Most	of	
the	 participants	 had	 adversarial	 feelings	 about	 the	 managerial	 strategies	 regarding	 employee	
involvement	and	 incentives.	 Limited	employee	 involvement	holds	productivity	down	by,	 inter	alia,	
weakening	 the	 authority	 of	middle	managers	 on	 the	 shop-floor	workers	 (Gallie	et	 al,	 2017).	 Core	
employees	challenge	paradoxical	precarity	from	time	to	time	by	using	their	occupational	skills	to	find	
another	job,	especially	if	they	have	degrees	from	the	prestigious	universities,	as	well	as	their	taking	
legal	action	for	compensation	in	the	case	of	unfair	dismissals	(Broughton	et	al,	2016).	
It	would	make	sense	for	the	companies	to	give	up	the	deployment	of	precarious	workers	in	order	to	
oust	core	employees	 (Wang	and	Heyes,	2017).	However,	 the	shipyards	 investigated	mostly	remain	
involuted	in	traditional	family	management.	Even	the	larger	companies	are	allured	by	euphemising	
autocratic	 management	 strategies	 with	 pseudo	 paternalism	 rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 ‘consent	
manufacturing’	 among	 the	 staff	 (Herman	 et	 al,	 1998).	 Besides,	 paradoxical	 precarity	 serves	 for	 a	
managerial	 short-termism.	 Companies	 resort	 to	 day-to-day	 solutions	 to	 curtail	 the	 cost	 of	 skilled	
labour	and	management	in	coping	with	the	competitive	pressures	whilst	keeping	the	tender	offers	as	
low	as	possible	in	order	to	attract	armatures.	
From	 a	 broader	 perspective,	 paradoxical	 precarity	 does	 not	 only	 undermine	 macro-economic	
performance	 for	 a	 compromised	 profitability	 in	 general,	 but	 it	 also	 risks	 divisive	 politics.	 The	
exploitative	use	of	Kurdish	migrants	(Alberti,	2014)	to	supplant	the	core	employees	feeds	into	racists	
sentiments	and	upsets	the	community	cohesion	as	the	middle-class	professionals	feel	insecure.	This	
threatens	 already	 escalated	 tensions	 between	 Kurds	 and	 Turks	 amid	 the	 on-going	war	 in	 densely	
Kurdish-populated	regions.	
Bearing	all	these	in	mind,	the	government	may	consider	stepping	in	to	bring	the	paradoxical	precarity	
under	control	by	developing,	for	example,	a	more	sympathetic	approach	to	unions’	call	for	abolishing	
the	tasheron	system.	It	 is	also	necessary	to	address	the	underlying	need	to	encourage	professional	
management	practices	against	 traditional	 family	management	 for	a	sustainable	economy.	This	will	
become	even	more	essential	since	the	competition	in	the	industry	is	likely	to	be	stiffened	once	the	
government	begins	to	implement	its	plans	to	sell	the	military	shipyards	to	both	domestic	and	foreign	
bidders.	 Therefore,	 policy	 makers	 should	 promote	 professional	 management	 by,	 for	 example,	
leadership	 training	 programmes	 and	 attracting	 highly-skilled	 international	 migrants	 to	 rectify	 the	
present	managerial	skills	gap	(Means,	2017).	Enforcing	fair	competition	provisions	against	opportunist	
armatures	 could	 further	 benefit	 the	 struggling	 companies.	 For	 better	 informed	 polices,	 however,	
future	research	may	explore	specific	skill	deficits	 in	shipyards	and	the	ways	 in	which	the	state	can	
provide	a	more	efficient	support	for	the	firms	together	with	their	employees,	especially	during	the	
	 15	
low	demand	periods.	Comparisons	with	other	 industries	and	more	regulated	 labour	markets	could	
also	prove	useful	(Holst,	2014).	
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Table I: Precarity of the Core 
and the Rest 
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Total 
  % % % % % % n† 
I am satisfied with discretion at 
work 
Core 21.4 56.3 15.5 4.9 1.9 100.0 103 
The rest 28.5 48.6 13.9 5.9 3.1 100.0 288 
I am satisfied with participation in 
decision making processes*** 
Core 16.7 29.4 27.5 14.7 11.8 100.0 102 
The rest 24.1 32.6 23.4 8.9 11.0 100.0 291 
I am satisfied with pay*** Core 9.9 37.6 22.8 15.8 13.9 100.0 101 
The rest 22.3 38.4 16.8 11.6 11.0 100.0 292 
I am satisfied with the fringe 
benefits 
Core 14.1 36.5 24.7 15.3 9.4 100.0 85 
The rest 22.7 31.7 21.6 9.0 15.1 100.0 278 
There is no job security in this 
workplace*** 
Core 23.3 27.2 15.5 17.5 16.5 100.0 103 
The rest 17.7 19.8 17.7 28.5 16.3 100.0 288 
Managers take unions seriously *** Core 17.7 15.2 36.7 20.3 10.1 100.0 79 
The rest 15.4 15.9 26.9 19.7 22.1 100.0 208 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (Significance results for the core/rest difference refer to T-test results –on the 
basis of five ordinal/Likert values) 
†Variations in sample-size are due to missing values 
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Table II: Precarity of the Core 
and the Rest 
 <1 year 1-5 years >5 years Total 
  % % % % n† 
Time worked in this company? ***z  Core 17.3 46.9 35.7 100.0 98 
The rest 21.6 60.4 17.9 100.0 273 
 A lot Some Little/None Total 
% % % % n† 
How much say you have regarding the 
work design? 
Core 33.0 36.9 33.1 100.0 103 
The rest 29.9 36.3 33.8 100.0 284 
How much say you have regarding the 
task distribution? ** 
Core 23.3 32.0 44.2 100.0 103 
The rest 30.6 32.6 36.8 100.0 291 
How much say you have regarding 
working hours? *** 
Core 17.5 18.4 64.1 100.0 103 
The rest 28.4 30.5 41.1 100.0 285 
ZT-test results on the basis of three ordinal values 
†See Table I for the notes 
 
 
Table III: Precarity of the 
Core and the Rest 
 
V
er
y 
G
oo
d 
G
oo
d 
N
/N
 
Po
or
 
V
er
y 
Po
or
  
 
Total 
  % % % % % % n† 
Employees’ Productivity*** Core 9.5 32.1 26.2 28.6 3.6 100.0 84 
The rest 25.0 30.8 9.0 25.0 10.3 100.0 156 
My own productivity*** Core 13.7 23.5 13.7 33.3 15.7 100.0 102 
The rest 34.5 40.2 7.4 8.8 9.1 100.0 296 
†See Table I for the notes 
 
 
 
Table IV: Precarity of the Core 
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  % % % % % % n† 
Managerial strategies increase 
employees’ motivation*** 
Core 6.0 7.1 17.9 28.6 40.5 100.0 84 
The rest 13.5 12.9 16.1 24.5 32.9 100.0 155 
Managerial strategies badly affect 
employees’ productivity*** 
Core 37.6 38.8 15.3 5.9 2.4 100.0 85 
The rest 41.5 22.0 15.9 14.6 6.1 100.0 164 
Managers treat us fairly** Core 18.6 23.5 27.5 26.5 3.9 100.0 102 
The rest 17.1 31.7 22.6 13.9 14.6 100.0 287 
Managers are keeping their 
promises*** 
Core 21.8 16.8 32.7 23.8 5.0 100.0 101 
The rest 21.2 31.6 21.5 12.2 13.5 100.0 288 
Managers try to understand and solve 
our problems*** 
Core 17.6 20.6 28.4 27.5 5.9 100.0 102 
The rest 16.7 37.2 20.8 12.8 12.5 100.0 288 
Managers are trying to increase our 
skills*** 
Core 17.6 21.6 26.5 26.5 7.8 100.0 102 
The rest 14.9 38.2 22.9 12.8 11.1 100.0 288 
My relations with the managers are 
generally good*** 
Core 18.6 21.6 18.6 31.4 9.8 100.0 102 
The rest 19.8 36.4 18.7 12.0 13.1 100.0 283 
†See Table I for the notes  
 
 
